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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final order of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (Judge David S. Young). Laina 
Roundy, the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j). The Utah Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "poured" this appeal 
"over" to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
JL Whether, in this personal injury case, the District Court committed 
reversible error in refusing to order counsel for defendant-appellee Travis Staley to 
disclose a planned "surveillance video" evidentiary presentation and planned testimony 
regarding that video. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this 
issue appears to be de novo (as purely a question of law). "[AJppellate review of a trial 
court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term ' correctness'" 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); "correctness" means "the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law." Id.; State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). See, 
also, inasmuch as the issue deals with the application of Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rather than the "balancing of factors" analysis that might lead to an 
l 
"abuse-of-discretion" standard of review, State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah 
App. 1993); Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 871 P.2d 570, 572 (Utah App. 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by oral 
objections raised by oral argument by counsel for Ms. Roundy (Tr. of proceedings of 
May 9, 1997, at 13-22; Tr. of proceedings of May 13, 1997, at 6-10). 
2, Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "... surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against" under Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, inhering in Mr. Staley's said planned evidentiary presentation. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be 
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a 
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of 
that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997 
proceedings, at 6-21). 
3. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "irregularity in the proceedings of the ... 
adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy] 
was prevented from having a fair trial/' under Rule 59(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, inhering in Mr. Staley's said planned evidentiary presentation and the 
District Court's said refusal to order disclosure thereof. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be 
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a 
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of 
that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997 
proceedings, at 6-21). 
4± Whether the District Court committed reversible error in denying 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on the "[e]rror in law/' under Rule 59(a)(7) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in the District Court's said refusal to 
order disclosure of Mr. Staley's planned surveillance video and related evidentiary 
presentation. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard with respect to this issue appears to be 
whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying the Motion for a 
New Trial. Amoss v. Bennion. 517 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Utah 1973). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by 
Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial (R. at 916-17); by her Memorandum in Support of 
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that Motion (R. at 918-38); by her Reply Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 
at 999-1000); and at oral argument on that Motion (Tr. of September 5, 1997 
proceedings, at 6-21). 
5, Whether the District Court committed reversible error in granting 
Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed Verdict on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this 
issue appears to be whether there was any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, on which a reasonable jury could reach a verdict contrary to the 
result sought by the motion. E.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988); Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Koer v. Mavfair Mkts. 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967); 
Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990). 
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings, by oral 
argument (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 91-97). 
IH. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT 
PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION 
On May 18, 1994, Laina Roundy, plaintiff-appellant, was, while driving 
her Pontiac Bonneville, attempting to make a left turn from southbound Redwood Road 
onto the eastbound 1-80 on-ramp in Salt Lake City. She pulled into the left turn lane 
and waited for traffic to clear. She testified that she started her left turn just as the 
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light was turning from yellow to red (e.g., Tr. of May 13, 1997 proceedings, at 40) and 
after several vehicles, proceeding northbound on Redwood Road, in the inside or 
westernmore of the two lanes of through traffic, had stopped or slowed on the yellow 
light (id. at 36). A Chevrolet Suburban, driven by Mr. Staley and proceeding in the 
outside or easternmore of the two lanes of northbound Redwood Road, entered the 
intersection at approximately 45 mph (e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 94), and 
collided with Ms. Roundy's car. Mr. Staley did not brake or take any evasive action 
(e.g., Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 83). The collision was nearly head-on. 
Ms. Roundy's airbag deployed but she still sustained allegedly serious personal injuries. 
Mr. Staley testified that the light had just turned yellow (Tr. of May 14, 1997 
proceedings, at 102) when he entered the intersection, but no witness gave a fact-based 
explanation for why several vehicles traveling in the direction Mr. Staley was traveling 
would be slowing and stopping (Mr. Staley acknowledged that slowing and stopping to 
be a fact — Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 108-09) except in response to a yellow 
light. Each driver's view of the other driver's vehicle was obscured by one or more 
high-profile vehicles in that westernmore lane of northbound Redwood Road (e.g., Tr. 
of May 13, 1997 proceedings, at 38; Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 85). 
Ms. Roundy brought this action seeking to recover for her injuries and 
damages suffered, sustained, and incurred in the subject collision. She was originally 
represented by her husband, Thor B. Roundy. When it became apparent that the case 
was headed for trial, Ms. Roundy retained her present counsel. 
During the jury selection process, counsel for Mr. Staley, in the course of 
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giving the names of witnesses he would call at trial, gave the name of one Ron 
Gunderson as a possible "rebuttal" witness. Neither Ms. Roundy nor her counsel nor 
anyone associated with her side of the case knew who Ron Gunderson was or what his 
role in the case would be (e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 13; Affidavit of 
Peter C. Collins (R. at 941-44); Affidavit of John H. Burraston, III (R. at 945-47)). 
Mr. Staley had not disclosed the existence of Mr. Gunderson or his proposed role in the 
case or anything regarding the surveillance videotape, in response to Ms. Roundy's 
discovery requests seeking pre-trial disclosure of trial witnesses and exhibits (R. at 
1030-40). Approximately 7 1/2 months prior to trial, Ms. Roundy propounded, under 
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. at 1041), a request for supplemen-
tation of discovery responses. Even in response to that request, neither Ron 
Gunderson's name nor his proposed involvement in the case was ever divulged prior to 
trial. Nor was the existence of the surveillance video that was ultimately commented 
on by defendant's witnesses and shown to the jury ever divulged or shown to 
Ms. Roundy, or her counsel, prior to trial. 
Shortly after Mr. Gunderson's name was first mentioned by Mr. Staley's 
counsel, Ms. Roundy's counsel inquired of Mr. Staley's counsel regarding 
Mr. Gunderson and inquiring, specifically, about the nature of his proposed involvement 
in the case (Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 13). Mr. Staley's counsel refused to 
disclose the requested information (id.), and Ms. Roundy's counsel brought the matter 
up with the District Court (id. at 13-22). In the course of argument on the matter, 
Mr. Staley's counsel contended, among other things, that, because there was no court 
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order that all witnesses be disclosed, Mr. Staley and his counsel were under no 
obligation to disclose Mr. Gunderson's identity or the subject matter of his proposed 
testimony prior to trial and that (in the face of Ms. Roundy's counsel's contention that 
Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure required Mr. Staley to supplement his 
responses to discovery requests when Ron Gunderson's possible involvement became 
apparent to Mr. Staley's counsel) Ms. Roundy's remedy, if she was dissatisfied with 
Mr. Staley's discovery responses, was to have filed a motion to compel prior to trial (id. 
at 16). Counsel for Mr. Staley also contended that the District Court's requiring him to 
divulge the role of Mr. Gunderson and his projected testimony would do away with 
what he essentially acknowledged to be the surprise nature of the projected testimony 
and that Mr. Gunderson's testimony would be used to show that Ms. Roundy was a liar 
(id. at 17). The District Court, after expressing the view that it could conceive of 
nothing more dramatic in a courtroom than a witness's being exposed as a liar (id. at 
20), and apparently rejecting Ms. Roundy's counsel's responding contention that the 
Rules make no exception for drama (id. at 20-21), denied Ms. Roundy's request that the 
nature of Mr. Gunderson's proposed evidentiary presentation be disclosed (id. at 22). 
Mr. Gunderson ultimately testified and played to the jury a surveillance 
videotape that purported to show Ms. Roundy engaged in activities she purportedly told 
the jury she could not do. Prior to the time that Mr. Gunderson testified and prior to 
the time that the video was shown, Dr. Gerald Moress, defendant's "independent" 
medical examination doctor and a very well-credentialed neurologist (Tr. of May 14, 
1997 proceedings, at 6-9), who had prepared an independent medical evaluation 
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("IME") report setting forth his view that Ms. Roundy had suffered a 5% permanent 
impairment (id. at 21) as a result of the subject motor vehicle collision, in essence 
testified that, after rendering that impairment opinion, he had viewed the videotape and, 
based on that viewing, had reason to question Ms. Roundy's veracity (id. at 22).l 
Dr. Moress never supplemented his written IME report. 
Ms. Roundy maintains that she was candid in her testimony and that the 
videotape shows nothing different from what she testified to but acknowledges that the 
jury may have viewed it differently, especially after having been told by as eminent an 
authority as Dr. Moress, that it showed things contrary to what she had told him about. 
The testimony of Mr. Gunderson and his surveillance videotape did not 
deal with the issue of who had what percentage of fault in the subject collision, but, as 
evidenced by Ms. Roundy's counsel's Affidavit (R. at 941-44) and the Affidavit of 
Ms. Roundy's liability expert (R. at 945-47), submitted subsequent to trial, the concern 
with the mysterious matter of Ron Gunderson considerably distracted Ms. Roundy's 
team. Probably more importantly, Mr. Staley's counsel developed a central theme, 
throughout the case, including in his closing argument (e.g., Tr. of May 15, 1997 
proceedings, at 25-26; 40-41; 46-47), linking Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility 
with respect to the severity of her injuries with her supposed lack of credibility 
regarding how the subject collision occurred. Because Ms. Roundy's testimony that the 
*It was only during Dr. Moress's testimony, on direct examination, and not in 
response to a question that signalled what was coming (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceed-
ings, at 21-22), that Ms. Roundy and her counsel became aware of the existence of the 
surveillance video. 
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light was red when Mr. Staley entered the intersection {e.g., Tr. of May 13, 1997 
proceedings, at 40-41) was the only direct evidence on that crucial particular,2 her 
credibility was central to her liability case. 
At the conclusion of Ms. Roundy's case, Mr. Staley moved for directed 
verdict (Tr. of May 14, 1997 proceedings, at 92) on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages 
claim. Even though evidence had been introduced that supported the proposition that 
Mr. Staley, driving a heavy, truck-like vehicle, roared blindly into a busy intersection 
on a light that had been red for as long as two seconds {e.g., Tr. of May 9, 1997 
proceedings, at 105-08), or longer, the District Court granted that Motion (Tr. of May 
14, 1997 proceedings, at 96). 
The jury ultimately determined, by its Special Verdict (R. at 887-89), that 
both Mr. Staley and Ms. Roundy were negligent and that the negligence of each of 
them was a proximate cause of Ms. Roundy's injuries. The jury also determined (id.), 
having been instructed that if Ms. Roundy should be adjudged to have had 50% or 
more of the causal fault she would recover nothing (R. at 855), that Mr. Staley had 
40% of the causal fault and that Ms. Roundy had 60% of the causal fault, and answered 
none of the questions regarding Ms. Roundy's damages. 
The District Court then entered judgment, on the verdict, in favor of 
Mr. Staley (R. at 907-09). 
2In his opening statement, Mr. Staley's counsel himself stated: "So it's going to be 
a question of what color the light was and exactly how this transpired." Second Tr. of 
May 8, 1997 proceedings, at 23. 
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Ms. Roundy then filed her Motion for a New Trial (R. at 916-17), 
contending that she was entitled to a new trial on alternative bases including the 
following: 
1. ''Irregularity in the proceedings of the court ... or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented 
from having a fair trial" (Rule 59(a)(1)); 
2. "Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against" (Rule 59(a)(3)); 
3. "Error in law" (Rule 59(a)(7)). 
The District Court denied that Motion (R. at 1054-56), and this Appeal 
ensued. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
L The District Court committed reversible error in refusing to order 
counsel for Mr. Staley to disclose the planned surveillance video and related evidentiary 
presentation. 
2± The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible 
error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "... surprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against," under Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in Dr. Moress's testimony regarding the surveillance 
videotape, in Mr. Gunderson's testimony regarding the surveillance videotape, and in 
the surveillance videotape itself. 
3. The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible 
10 
error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on "irregularity in the 
proceedings of the ... adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented from having a fair trial," under Rule 59(a)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, with such irregularity and abuse of discretion having to 
do with Mr. Staley's counsel's refusing to disclose, in timely fashion, the surveillance 
video and related evidence, and the District Court's countenancing that non-disclosure. 
4. The District Court abused its discretion and committed reversible 
error by denying Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial based on the District Court's 
"[ejrror in law," under Rule 59(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, inhering in 
the District Court's refusal to order disclosure of Mr. Staley's planned surveillance video 
and related evidentiary presentation. 
5^  The District Court committed error in granting Mr. Staley's Motion 
for Directed Verdict on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. MR. STALEY'S COUNSEL FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE RULES 
IN REFUSING TO DISCLOSE HIS PLANNED EVIDENTIARY 
PRESENTATION, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO ORDER DISCLOSURE, 
AND MS. ROUNDY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER 
EITHER THE "DE NOVO' STANDARD OF REVIEW OR THE 
"ABUSE-OF-DISCRETION" STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
JL PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
As this Court will readily observe, the first four of the five aspects 
(presented immediately hereinabove) of Ms. Roundy's argument are interrelated. They 
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all deal with the conduct of Mr. Staley's counsel in refusing to disclose Mr. Staley's 
planned evidentiary presentation regarding the surveillance video and the District 
Court's countenancing that conduct. 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: 
(e) Supplementation of responses- A party who has responded to a 
request for discovery with a response that was complete when 
made is under no duty to supplement his response to include 
information thereafter acquired, except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his 
response with respect to any question directly addressed to 
(A) the identity and location of persons having knowledge of 
discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each person 
expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject 
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance 
of his testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior re-
sponse if he obtains information upon the basis of which 
(A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, 
or (B) he knows that the response though correct when made 
is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a 
failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of 
the court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to 
trial through new requests for supplementation of prior 
responses. 
On or about October 19, 1994, Ms. Roundy propounded Plaintiffs' First 
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Things and Requests 
for Admission to Defendants. In that request Ms. Roundy included detailed definitions 
pertinent to the discovery requests at issue. Comprehensive definitions of the terms 
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"document" and "identify" appear in the Addendum hereto, at 2-4. Mr. Staley's 
pertinent responses to those discovery requests are the following (also reproduced in the 
Addendum hereto), at 6-8: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on 
your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief 
summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses may be 
called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order 
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without 
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel 
will call: Plaintiffs, Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie 
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jiminez, expert witnesses as yet undeter-
mined and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify all individuals who may have 
information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint and 
Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer a brief summary of the 
information which they may have. 
ANSWER: Plaintiff would best know who has information about their 
Complaint. As to defendants' Answer, Objection: the Answer was 
prepared by counsel, and it is the product of counsel's mental impressions 
and legal analysis; as such the information requested is protected as work 
product pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As to the 
general subject matter of this litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley 
and Travis Staley, Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jiminez, 
plaintiffs' treating physicians and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as 
expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of 
their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed 
testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be 
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called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order 
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without 
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel 
will call an accident reconstructionist, one or more medical experts, who 
are undetermined at this time, and one or more medical experts who will 
perform Independent Medical Examinations; other experts may likely be 
called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required 
by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at 
trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may be used at 
trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for 
providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the court. 
On or about September 25, 1996, Ms. Roundy propounded her Rule 26(e) 
Request for Supplementation (reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 9). Mr. Staley 
responded as follows (also reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 10-12): 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on 
your behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief 
summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions about 
which witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will 
comply with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time 
designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated 
at this time that defense counsel will call: Laina Roundy, Travis Staley, 
Melodie Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jiminez, Anita Sachez and 
undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as 
expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of 
their resume or curriculum vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed 
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testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for 
defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be 
called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order 
for designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without 
waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel 
will call an Ronald L. Probert, accident reconstructionist, Gerald Moress 
M.D., and other experts may likely be called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required 
by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at 
trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has not yet 
made decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial. Counsel for 
defendant will comply with the court's order for providing exhibits or 
exhibit lists at the time designated by the court. Without waiving that 
objection, defendant may use the following exhibits at trial: A diagram of 
the accident scene involved in the subject accident; Defendant may use a 
computer animation/recreation of the subject accident; Photographs of the 
accident scene; Portions of plaintiffs medical records and medical 
expenses, including extracts and summaries of such; Copies, redacted as 
necessary, of the investigating officer's reports, diagrams and statements; 
Photographs of the defendant's vehicle; Photographs of the plaintiffs 
vehicle; Repair records of the parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and 
employment records of plaintiff, including extracts and summaries of 
such; IME reports; Experts' reports; Defendant reserves the right to submit 
additional exhibits obtained from materials in conjunction with formal 
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional 
exhibits as needed for rebuttal of plaintiffs claims; Defendant reserves the 
right to submit additional exhibits prepared between the date of this 
Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and the date of trial. 
That was the status of things at the commencement of trial. 
Z TRIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The pertinent trial developments are detailed, hereinabove, at pages 5-9, 
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and Ms. Roundy incorporates, by this reference, that history. The colloquy, argument, 
and District Court ruling on the Ron Gunderson Mystery are reproduced in the 
Addendum hereto, at 14-22, and those things are, by this reference, incorporated herein. 
Suffice it to say, in the interest of refraining from repetition, that Ms. Roundy and her 
counsel knew nothing about Mr. Gunderson and his planned role in the case, or about 
any surveillance video, until Dr. Moress (Mr. Staley's ,,independent,/ medical examiner) 
mentioned the surveillance video in the course of a lengthy narrative (Tr. of May 14, 
1997 proceedings, at 20-22) in response to a question that did not signal the impending 
dropping of the bombshell. At that point, "the cat was out of the bag," and 
Ms. Roundy and her counsel had to deal with the surprise nature of the testimony as 
well as they could. 
1 LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Mr. Staley's counsel had a duty, under Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, especially in the face of Ms. Roundy's Request for Supplementation, to 
disclose Mr. Gunderson's role, the existence of the videotape, and the fact that 
Dr. Moress would make reference to the videotape in his testimony. Mr. Staley's 
contention that Ms. Roundy had a duty to proceed by a Motion to Compel, when she 
had no inkling of the nature of the evidence whose disclosure she would be seeking to 
compel,3 is sophistry. Nor can Mr. Staley's counsel rest comfortably, in the face of 
3It may be of interest that Mr. Staley's counsel himself expressed the view (Tr. of 
proceedings of May 13, 1997, at 9-10) that it is unlikely that a Motion to Compel 
would have been granted. 
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Ms. Roundy's discovery requests and Request for Supplementation, on his contention 
that he was excused from providing substantive discovery responses by the fact that 
there was no separate court order mandating the disclosure of witnesses. 
Furthermore, Mr. Staley's contention that the evidence was ,/rebuttal,/ 
evidence misapprehends the nature of "rebuttal" evidence. A "rebuttal" case is a case 
that a plaintiff puts on after the defendant's case. A "rebuttal" argument is argument 
that a plaintiffs lawyer makes after the defendant's lawyer has completed his or her 
argument. And "rebuttal" evidence is typically evidence that a plaintiff puts on to rebut 
a defendant's evidence. 
Mr. Staley's counsel had taken two depositions of Ms. Roundy, the second 
one very shortly before the trial and limited to inquiry regarding Ms. Roundy's then-
present condition. Mr. Staley knew, in essence, through his counsel, what Ms. Roundy 
was going to say at trial about her physical condition and has never contended that he 
was surprised by any supposed change between her deposition testimony and her trial 
testimony. 
If Mr. Staley's position is taken to its logical conclusion, a defendant 
could get away, in a virtually limitless number of situations, with non-disclosure of 
planned evidentiary presentation, simply by calling his evidence "rebuttal" evidence 
and, given the defendant's own purported view of truth and falsity, take the position 
that that evidence would only be used if necessary to expose any witness as a "liar." 
The defendant would then be dictating the rules of discovery, and that is precisely what 
the District Court in this case allowed to happen. That cannot be the law. 
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Cases from Utah and from other jurisdictions express strong disapproval 
for the trial-by-ambush strategy employed by Mr. Staley and countenanced by the 
District Court. 
In Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1994), a case in 
which the witness in question was the plaintiffs "rebuttal" witness, the Utah Supreme 
Court observed: 
... disclosure [of all potential witnesses in advance of trial] ... serves a 
number of significant purposes.... It gives both parties the opportunity to 
prepare adequately for trial, including, among other things, deposing 
witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony, and preparing an effective 
cross-examination.... It also encourages the parties to make a serious 
effort to investigate the facts and discover all relevant witnesses in a 
timely manner. Finally, it furthers the orderly and efficient administration 
of justice by avoiding delays which might otherwise be necessary to 
accommodate the need to prepare for a surprise witness.... When the 
offering party contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut 
the adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence 
"sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to 
trial." 
Here there is no doubt that Ms. Roundy's testimony about her physical condition and 
limitations was "reasonably anticipated prior to trial." 
In Lascano v. Vowell 940 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 1996), the appellate 
court held it to reversible error for the trial court to delay ruling on, and ultimately to 
allow, the admission of a late-designated defense surveillance video. Among the 
reasons given by that court for its ruling was that the "plaintiff was placed at a 
significant disadvantage by having to rebut the exhibit without sufficient time to 
prepare properly." M a t 981. 
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In Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704, 705-07 (Fla. 1980), the court, in the 
course of reversing for new trial, held that the existence and contents of surveillance 
films to be used as evidence are discoverable and observed that pertinent discovery 
rules were adopted to eliminate prejudice inhering in the surprise disclosure of 
evidence. 
In Perez-Perez v. Popular Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 
1993), the First Circuit reversed a judgment on a jury verdict, holding that the trial 
court's admission of an undisclosed witness's testimony was an abuse of discretion. 
There the court observed: 
Without time to review [the witness's] records ... or arrange for a rebuttal 
expert, ... counsel was precluded from effectively addressing the charge. 
We have no doubt that this state of the record exactly comports 
with the definition of unfair surprise succinctly set out by the Court 
of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit: 
It is well settled that Rule 59 provides a means of relief in cases in 
which a party has been made the victim of surprise. The surprise, 
however, must be inconsistent with ... substantial justice in order to 
justify a grant of a new trial.... 
In Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), the Tenth 
Circuit reversed a judgment on a jury verdict and, in the course of determining that the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony of an undisclosed witness, 
observed: 
The failure of a party to comply with discovery requests under rule 26 has 
led to findings of prejudice resulting in the exclusion of the proffered 
evidence. Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 106, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978); 
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Tabatchnick v. G. D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975). 
Similarly, although district courts enjoy wide discretion in handling 
discovery and pretrial matters, Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Macomber, 
Inc., 601 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1979), reversible error has been found in 
allowing testimony without such discovery where there has been a "gross 
abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the 
case." Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1977); Shelak v. 
White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978); Weiss v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975). 
626 F.2d at 794. 
It cannot be seriously contended by Mr. Staley that the District Court did 
not commit error in refusing to order disclosure. Nor can it be seriously contended that 
Ms. Roundy and her counsel were not "surprised" or that "ordinary prudence" could 
have "guarded against" that surprise. Nor can it be seriously contended that the non-
disclosure and/or the District Court's countenancing that non-disclosure did not amount 
to "irregularity in the proceedings of the adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
abuse of discretion by which [Ms. Roundy] was prevented from having a fair trial." 
Nor can it be seriously contended that the District Court's refusal to order disclosure did 
not amount to an "[e]rror in law." 
Whether the focus of this Court's analysis is appropriately on the first 
designated issue on appeal (pages 1-2 hereinabove), calling for a de novo standard of 
review, or on any of the next three designated issues (pages 2-4 hereinabove), calling 
for an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, or on some combination of those issues, 
the outcome of the analysis should be the same: the District Court clearly erred in 
countenancing the non-disclosure, the non-disclosure was most "irregular"; the non-
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disclosure and the District Court's countenancing it prevented Ms. Roundy from 
receiving a fair trial; and the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to order a 
new trial. 
B. NEITHER MR. STALEY'S COUNSELS CONDUCT NOR THE 
DISTRICT COURTS REFUSAL TO ORDER DISCLOSURE WAS 
"HARMLESS." 
Ms. Roundy is, through her counsel, well aware of the "harmless error" 
aspect of the law that is embodied in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
that is expressly referenced in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On the 
facts of this case, this Court should determine, in the words of Rule 61, that "refusal [to 
order a new trial]" would be "inconsistent with substantial justice." 
Ms. Roundy acknowledges that a superficial review of the jury's verdict 
would cause any law-trained person to conclude that any error or irregularity in the 
proceedings having to do with the surveillance video and related evidence should be 
considered harmless. After all, that evidence dealt only with Ms. Roundy's damages — 
or the lack thereof — and the jury never got to damages on the Special Verdict. When 
it found that Ms. Roundy had 60% of the causal fault, its job was done. And it knew 
that to be the case. So, one asks, why was the District Court's error not harmless? 
And why were the irregularities of Mr. Staley's counsel not harmless? 
The answer can be found, as suggested hereinabove, at page 8, in 
Mr. Staley's counsel's entire approach to the defense of this case. The liability issue in 
this case, when stripped to its essence, came down to the question of whether the traffic 
light was red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the intersection. Mr. Staley's counsel 
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essentially acknowledged that to be the case in his opening statement (Second Tr. of 
May 8, 1997 proceedings, at 23). For if, as Ms. Roundy testified, the light turned red4 
just as she started her turn, and if, as the experts agreed (e.g., Tr. of May 14, 1997 
proceedings, at 164, 192 (Mr. Staley's expert testifying)), it took 2.4 seconds to 3.1 
seconds from the time Ms. Roundy began her turn until impact occurred, the light was 
"cold red" when Mr. Staley entered the intersection, and no reasonable jury could have 
found that Ms. Roundy had, if any fault, more fault than Mr. Staley had. 
As pointed out hereinabove, at pages 8-9, Ms. Roundy is the only witness 
who testified that the light was definitely red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the 
intersection. Her credibility thus became crucial to the success of her liability case. 
And, as explained hereinabove, at page 8, in his closing argument Mr. Staley's counsel 
played Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility on the damages issue ~ as supposedly 
proved by the surveillance video — (Exhibit 23-D) for all it was supposedly worth, in 
connection with his argument on the liability issue. The most pertinent parts of that 
argument are reproduced in the Addendum hereto, at 25-30. 
The jury had been instructed (R. at 855; p. 32 of Addendum hereto) that 
Ms. Roundy would recover nothing if she was found to have 50% or more of the causal 
fault. The jury had also been instructed (R. at 849; p. 31 of Addendum hereto) that if 
the jury believed that any witness (including Ms. Roundy) had willfully testified falsely 
4Lest there be any uncertainty, the light for Ms. Roundy was, at all pertinent times, 
the same color as was the light for Mr. Staley (Tr. of May 9, 1997 proceedings, at 78-
79). 
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as to any material matter (including, by implication, the severity of her injuries), the 
jury could disregard her entire testimony, except as corroborated by other, credible 
testimony. Mr. Staley's counsel (Tr. of May 15, 1997 proceedings, at 26; Addendum at 
26) hammered on that instruction in his closing argument, and there was no solid 
corroborating evidence that the light was red when Mr. Staley's Suburban entered the 
intersection. 
The link between Ms. Roundy's supposed lack of credibility on damages 
and liability issues and the significance of that supposed lack of credibility, founded 
substantially on the surprise surveillance video and Dr. Moress's surprise testimony 
regarding it, and the significance of that link to the jury's defense liability verdict is 
thus established. 
What, then, of the question of what Ms. Roundy could have done with the 
surveillance video if she had been allowed to learn of its existence and that of its 
"author" and had been allowed to view it in perfectly timely fashion (or even when the 
issue was raised with the District Court on the second day of trial)? The list in 
response is long. The following are examples only. Her counsel could have, in the 
universally recognized crucial trial phase of opening statement, discussed it (if it had, 
indeed, survived a motion in limine). Her counsel could have deposed Mr. Gunderson 
to learn of the details of its taking. Her counsel could have interrogated Mr. Gunderson 
regarding its editing and the other details of the production process and thereby 
determined how realistic and full and accurate a picture it gave. Her counsel could 
have explored the nature of Mr. Gunderson's background and his working with 
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Mr. Staley's counsel. Her counsel could have prepared better cross-examinations of 
Dr. Moress and Mr. Gunderson. She would have had time (there was a weekend 
between the time of the Ron Gunderson discussion with the District Court and the time 
of Dr. Moress's testimony and the conclusion of the trial) to locate the exact fake 
"potted plant" depicted in the video and bring it to the courtroom so the jury could feel 
how light it really was. She could have had her very friend who is depicted in the 
video come to testify about her weakened condition. She could have been prepared to 
explain what was going on in her life and the "kind of day" she was having while the 
video was being taken. And her counsel could have moved, with, perhaps, success, 
under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, for exclusion of the video and all 
references to it by reason of such things as its prejudicial and confusing {e.g., fake 
plant) nature. 
The fact that we live in a video-intensive age needs no citation of 
authority. A jury that had spent several trial days dealing with essentially verbal 
evidentiary presentations, from both sides, would be expected to pay special heed to a 
"cloak-and-dagger" video investigative product. Mr. Staley's counsel played all this for 
all it was worth, and more. And the District Court itself (Tr. of May 15, 1997 
proceedings, at 228) suggested turning off the lights in the courtroom. The significance 
of this surprise evidence, and of Dr. Moress's surprise reference to it, cannot be 
overstated, and neither Mr. Staley's counsel's conduct nor the District Court's counte-
nancing that conduct was "harmless." 
If this Court should grant Ms. Roundy's Motion for New Trial, it will not 
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be the first time that an appellate court has determined reversible, liability-case error to 
inhere in what appears, on superficial review, to be error that would deal only with 
damages issues. In Green v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 
1033-34 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit reversed a judgment on a no-liability jury 
verdict in a situation where the trial court erroneously allowed evidence of collateral 
source payments to come to the jury's attention. The link there recognized — 
The major reason for excluding collateral source evidence is the concern 
that juries will be more likely to find no liability if they know that 
plaintiff has received some compensation. 
Id. at 1033 — especially when there was no apparent attempt by the defendant's counsel 
there (unlike here) to link damages issues with liability issues, seems considerably 
weaker, if anything, than the link here. 
The non-disclosure was not harmless, the District Court's refusal to order 
disclosure was not harmless, and Ms. Roundy is entitled to a new trial. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING 
MR. STALEYS MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM. 
Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim was based on the proposition that 
Mr. Staley acted, in the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, with a knowing and 
reckless disregard toward, and a conscious disregard of, the rights of others, if, as 
Ms. Roundy contends is the fact, he drove his Suburban, with his vision obstructed, 
into a busy intersection against a traffic light that had been red for approximately two 
seconds, or longer. 
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Ms. Roundy had the facts and the law to keep her punitive damages claim 
in the case, and the District Court erred in granting Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed 
Verdict on that claim. Ms. Roundy acknowledges that if she does not succeed in this 
Appeal on one or more of the grounds set forth hereinabove, the issue will be moot, 
but, confident of the proposition that this Court will reverse and remand for new trial 
on one or more of the issues discussed hereinabove, Ms. Roundy urges this Court to 
include, in its remand order, a directive to the District Court to enable her to proceed, 
in that new trial, with her punitive damages claim. 
The standard for imposition of punitive damages is set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §78-18-1: 
. . . conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
That Utah statute appears to codify, verbatim, the holding of this Court in Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.. 749 P.2d 660, 670 (Utah App. 1988) (citing 
three Utah Supreme Court cases). In Gleave, this Court, in discussing the trial court's 
granting of the defendant's motion for directed verdict on the punitive damages claim, 
applied an analysis that fits every directed verdict context: 
If . . . reasonable inferences supporting judgment for the [party 
resisting the directed verdict motion] could be drawn from the 
evidence presented at trial, the directed verdict cannot be sustained 
[Utah Supreme Court citations omitted]. This is so even if reason-
able persons might reach different conclusions on the punitive 
damages issue after considering the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
There are, undeniably, as is clear from the foregoing quotation from 
Gleave, cases in which it is appropriate for the jury to determine whether punitive 
damages should be awarded. The instant case is one such case. On Ms. Roundy's 
version of the liability facts of this case, the jury could well have determined and could 
in a new trial well determine, pursuant to the clear and convincing evidence standard of 
proof applicable to punitive damages claims, that Mr. Staley acted with "knowing and 
reckless indifference toward and disregard of the rights of others/' including 
Ms. Roundy. Perhaps the jury will not in the new trial so find, but it is certainly a 
question on which reasonable minds could differ, under Ms. Roundy's version of the 
facts. 
Utah law allows Utah jurors — if there is some substantial basis that takes 
the case, as a matter for reasonable jury determination, outside the realm of mere inad-
vertence or mistake, or the "ordinary" run of cases, and when they are appropriately 
instructed on the statutory requirement for imposition of punitive damages — to make 
the determination of whether an award of punitive damages is appropriate. If 
Mr. Staley made a decision — something a jury would reasonably conclude to have 
occurred — to drive into a busy intersection, on a red light, when his view of turning 
vehicles, like Ms. Roundy's, was obstructed, a jury should be allowed to decide whether 
that conduct is egregious enough to lead to the imposition of punitive damages. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Ms. Roundy urges this Court to reverse 
and remand, for new trial, on one or more of the grounds discussed hereinabove, and 
also to reverse the District Court's granting of Mr. Staley's Motion for Directed Verdict 
on Ms. Roundy's punitive damages claim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^W&ay of November, 1998. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Laina 
Roundy 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on t h e ^ r ^ a y of November, 1998, I caused to be 
served two true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT LAINA ROUNDY by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Lynn S. Davies HAND DELIVERY 
Christian W. Nelson _X_ U.S. MAIL 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson OVERNIGHT MAIL 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor TELECOPY (FAX) 
50 S. Main Street (532-5506) 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
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John Edward Hansen 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ROUND Y\APPEAL\BRI EF. APL 
HAND DELIVERY 
J L U.S. MAIL 
OVERNIGHT MAIL 
TELECOPY (FAX) 
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ADDENDUM 
Kyle W. Jones (Bar No. 1744) 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 359-7771 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 643 5) 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
660 South 200 East, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 355-5080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual, 
THOR ROUNDY, an individual, 
and LAINA ROUNDY, as guardian 
ad litem for ANASTASIA ROUNDY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
NEIL STALEY, an individual, 
and TRAVIS STALEY, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS7 FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
AND THINGS AND REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS TO DEFENDANTS 
Civil No. 940906068CV 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiffs Thor and Laina and Anastasia Roundy ("Roundys"), by 
and through their undersigned counsel, hereby submit to Defendants 
Travis Staley and Neil Staley, Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests 
for Admissions pursuant to the provisions of Rules 26, 33, 34, and 
3 6 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Roundys demand that 
the aforementioned Defendants respond to each Interrogatory and 
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Request for Admission under oath and produce the documents 
designated below that are in their possession, custody or control 
and do so at the law offices of Thor B. Roundy, 660 South 200 East, 
Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 or at such other place as is 
mutually agreeable to counsel for the parties and to produce the 
things designated at such place as is mutually agreeable to counsel 
for the parties, within thirty (30) days of the date of service 
hereof. Pursuant to Rule 36, the Request for Admissions shall be 
deemed admitted unless such requests are responded to within thirty 
(30) days of the service of such requests. Upon such production, 
the Roundys further request that the aforementioned Defendants 
permit the inspection and/or copying of the documents produced. 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions shall be used herein except as 
indicated to the contrary: 
1. The terms "you" and "your" refer to Travis Staley 
and Neil Staley. 
To the extent that the answers of each defendant would differ, 
provide a separate answer for each defendant. 
2. The term "document" or "documents" as used herein 
shall mean the originals and all nonidentical copies (whether 
different from the originals because of any alterations, notes, 
comments, or other material contained therein or attached thereto 
or otherwise) and drafts of all written, printed, recorded or 
graphic matter of every kind and description, together with any 
thor\staley\discover\lrr 2 i 
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attachment thereto or enclosure therewith, in any way relating or 
referring to or concerning the subject matter of the request, 
whether inscribed or mechanical, electronic, microfilm, 
photographic or by other means as well as all phonic or visual 
reproductions, including but not limited to: diaries, contracts, 
drafts, manuals, reports, telegrams, notes, compilations, 
schedules, tabulations, tallies, charts, tables, diagrams, 
drawings, interoffice and intra-office memoranda, memoranda for 
file, minutes of meetings, photocopies, circulars, pamphlets, 
registration statements, registration documents, memoranda of 
telephonic conversations, memoranda of meetings and conferences, 
correspondence, accounting records, computer-stored data or data 
bases, or computer printouts or programs, or any other documents 
such as a code for a computer run or printout, tape recordings of 
any statement or conversation, and any other retrievable data in 
your possession, custody or control as known to you, wherever 
located, including documents in the possession of any of your 
current or former agents, attorneys, accountants, servants, 
employers or employees. 
3. The term "person" or "persons" shall mean the plural 
as well as the singular and shall include any natural person and 
any firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal 
entity. 
thor\staley\discover\lrr 3 1; 
4. The term "identify," in any of its various forms, 
when used in referring to persons, as defined above, shall mean and 
require you to state with regard to each person so designated: 
(a) the name of the person; 
(b) the person's present (or last known) business 
and home address; 
(c) the person's present (or last known) employer; 
(d) the person's title and duties of each position 
held with that employer. 
5. The term "identify," in any of its various forms, 
when used in relationship to the term "document" or "documents" 
shall require you to state with regard to each document so 
designated: 
(a) the title and date appearing on the document; 
and the date of the document's preparation, if known; 
(b) a description of the document in sufficient 
detail to enable it to be specifically identified; 
(c) the name(s), address(es) and title(s) (if 
known) of the author(s) and signer(s) of the document; 
(d) the name(s) and business address(es) of the 
persons presently having custody of the original document (and 
of any copies thereof of which you have knowledge); 
(e) the name(s) and business address(es) of each 
person having knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in 
such documents; 
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LYNN S. DAVIES [A0824] 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 So. Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual, 
THOR ROUNDY, an individual, 
and LAINA ROUNDY as guardian 
ad litem for ANASTASIA ROUNDY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NEIL STALEY, an individual, 
and TRAVIS STALEY, an 
individual, 
Defendants. j 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 940906068 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley hereby answer 
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
GENERAL OBJECTION: Plaintiffs' Interrogatories are 
excessively long and unduly burdensome. They are also violative 
of the provisions of Rule 26(b), second paragraph, items (i)-
(iii). Insofar as the Interrogatories relate to the Complaint, 
the Complaint itself was unduly long and burdensome. 
INTERROGATORY NO. l: State the name of every person 
who contributes to your answers to these discovery requests. For 
1030 
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each person, state the address and telephone number where they 
live and state every other address and telephone number at which 
they can be reached. 
ANSWER: Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, and 
their attorney, Lynn S. Davies and his staff at Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you 
intend to call on your behalf at trial on this matter. Include 
in your answer a brief summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER; OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel 
for defendant has not yet made decisions about which witnesses 
may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with 
the court's order for designating witnesses at the time 
designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is 
anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call: 
Plaintiffs, Defendants Neil Staley and Travis Staley, Melodie 
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jimenez, expert witnesses as yet 
undetermined and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify all individuals who may 
have information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint or Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer a brief 
summary of the information which they may have. 
ANSWER: Plaintiffs would best know who has information 
about their Complaint. As to defendants' Answer, Objection: the 
0006 I b 
Answer was prepared by counsel, and it is the product of 
counsel's mental impressions and legal analysis; as such the 
information requested is protected as work product pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). As to the general subject 
matter of this litigation, plaintiffs, defendants Neil Staley and 
Travis Staley, Officer Hawk, Melodie Kraft, Maryann Jimenez, 
plaintiffs' treating physicians and undoubtedly others, 
INTERROGATORY NO, 4: Identify all individuals you 
plan to use as expert witnesses at trial in this matter. Include 
in your answer a copy of their resume or curriculum vitae, and a 
brief summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel 
for defendant has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses 
that may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply 
with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time 
designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is 
anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call an 
accident reconstructionist, one or more medical experts, who are 
undetermined at this time, and one or more medical experts who 
will perform Independent Medical Examinations; other experts may 
likely be called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify all individuals you 
have consulted as experts but do not plan to use on your behalf 
3 
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at a trial on this matter. Include in your answer a copy of 
their resume or curriculum vitae. 
ANSWER: Objection - such information is protected as 
work product pursuant to URCP 26(b)(3). Without waiving that 
objection, there are no such experts at this time. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 6: Identify all documents (in the 
detail required by "Definitions" paragraph 5, above) you intend 
to use on your behalf at a trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel 
for defendant has not yet made decisions about which exhibits may 
be used at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court/s order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time 
designated by the court. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7; Identify all documents (in the 
detail required by "Definitions11 paragraph 5, above) which may 
contain information concerning the allegations of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and/or Defendant's Answer. Include in your answer, but 
do not limit it to, an identification of all individuals with 
information concerning your response. 
ANSWER: See Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 
3. Without waiving that Objection, see Salt Lake Police 
Department Accident Investigation Report No. 94-65770. 
4 
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Peter C. Collins (#0700) 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C« 
4021 South 700 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 2 65-1888 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TRAVIS STALEY, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 2 6(e) 
REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTATION 
Civil No. 940906068CV 
Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff Laina Roundy (the only remaining plaintiff in 
this case), by and through her lawyers, requests that defendant, 
pursuant to Rule 2 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
specifically in response to this Request, supplement his responses 
to all Interrogatories and all Requests for Production of Documents 
previously submitted to defendant by plaintiff. 
DATED this Z~- day q£)September, 199 6. 
PEtfER C. COLLINS 
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
0009 
0 
LYNNS.DAVIES [A0824] 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON [A5771] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 So. Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TRAVIS STALEY, an individual, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 940906068 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant Travis Staley hereby provides Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs 
First Set of Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify all witnesses you intend to call on your 
behalf at trial on this matter. Include in your answer a brief summary of their proposed 
testimony. 
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ANSWER: Counsel for defendant has not yet made decisions about which 
witnesses may be called at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the court's order for 
designating witnesses at the time designated by the court. Without waiving that objection, it is 
anticipated at this time that defense counsel will call: Laina Roundy, Travis Staley, Melodie 
Kraft, Officer Hawk, Maryann Jimenez, Anita Sachez and undoubtedly others. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify all individuals you plan to use as expert 
witnesses at trial in this matter. Include in your answer a copy of their resume or curriculum 
vitae, and a brief summary of their proposed testimony. 
ANSWER: OBJECTION. Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant 
has not yet made decisions about expert witnesses that may be called at trial. Counsel for 
defendant will comply with the court's order for designating witnesses at the time designated by 
the court. Without waiving that objection, it is anticipated at this time that defense counsel will 
call an Ronald L. Probert, accident ^constructionist, Gerald Moress M.D., and other experts 
may likely be called as well. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all documents (in the detail required by 
"Definitions'1 paragraph 5, above) you intend to use on your behalf at a trial on this matter. 
ANSWER: Discovery is on-going and counsel for defendant has not yet made 
decisions about which exhibits may be used at trial. Counsel for defendant will comply with the 
court's order for providing exhibits or exhibit lists at the time designated by the court. Without 
waiving that objection, defendant may use the following exhibits at trial: A diagram of the 
accident scene involved in the subject accident; Defendant may use a computer 
oon1 n 
animation/recreation of the subject accident; Photographs of the accident scene; Portions of 
plaintiffs medical records and medical expenses, including extracts and summaries of such; 
Copies, redacted as necessary, of the investigating police officer's reports, diagrams and 
statements; Photographs of the defendant's vehicle; Photographs of the plaintiffs vehicle; 
Repair records for the parties' vehicles; Income, benefits and employment records of plaintiff, 
including extracts and summaries of such; IME reports; Experts' reports; Defendant reserves the 
right to submit additional exhibits obtained from materials supplied in conjunction with formal 
discovery in this matter; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits as needed for 
rebuttal of plaintiffs claims; Defendant reserves the right to submit additional exhibits prepared 
between the date of this Supplemental Answer to Interrogatories and the date of trial. 
DATED this day of November, 1996. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
.YNN S. DAVIES 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
--00O00--
LAINA ROUNDY and THOR 
ROUNDY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
NEIL STALEY and TRAVIS 
STALEY, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 940906068 CV 
Judge David S. Young 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
MAY 9, 19 97 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
CERTIFIED COPY 
REPORTED BY TIFFANY WALTERS, CSR, RPR 
1 about that yesterday. Based on his experience as a 
2 police officer, he was able to conclude from those 
3 things something about the speed, plus the fact that 
4 he will testify that the man sped up to beat the 
5 light. That's an important underlying basis. 
6 THE COURT: I'll let that fact in, but the 
7 condition of the light, he can't testify to that. 
8 MR. COLLINS: I understand, and I'll just 
9 try to lay the foundation with him. 
10 MR. DAVIES: I guess I would just alert the 
11 Court that when we get to that, I would anticipate 
12 probably asking to conduct some voir dire examination 
13 to determine whether he has the foundation or not. 
14 MR. COLLINS: Can I ask you something while 
15 we're here? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 MR. COLLINS: You may have a different 
18 understanding about the concept of a rebuttal witness 
19 than mine, but he and I had a little discussion. We 
20 need your help. We need a ruling on this. He 
21 mentioned in his disclosure all possible witnesses, 
22 yet a name of Ron Gunnerson, that is a person that I 
23 have never heard of and my client has never heard of, 
24 and we asked for rebuttal, possible rebuttal 
25 witnesses. 
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1 My understanding of a rebuttal witness is, 
2 typically, someone that the Plaintiff brings up to 
3 rebut something that the Defendants' -- of the 
4 Defendants' case. Sometimes, I guess the term 
5 applies probably if there is a surprise in the 
6 Plaintiffs' cause, I asked Mr. Davies to tell me who 
7 Mr. Gunnerson was and what was he was going to say. 
8 Mr. Davies refused to tell me that, that it might 
9 underline the effectiveness of the witness in this 
10 case. 
11 We don't have any surprises in our lawsuit, 
12 Your Honor. Ms. Roundy has been deposed twice. Mr. 
13 Davies knows full well what our position is in this 
14 case on damages, and I have the feeling that Mr. 
15 Gunnerson is some kind of a surprise, perhaps a 
16 surveillance video person, and if Mr. Davies knows or 
17 has reason to believe that he's going to use him, 
18 based on what he thinks he's going to put out in this 
19 case, I don't think it's fair. I think I'm entitled 
20 to know that. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Davies? 
22 MR. DAVIES: I have two points, Your 
23 Honor. First of all, in this matter, the Court did 
24 not ever require us to disclose witnesses to one 
25 another or exhibits. We've done so voluntarily, and 
9P15 
1 I think everything's been disclosed, except for 
2 matters pertaining to Mr. Gunnerson, but that was 
3 voluntarily. I don't think it was required in this 
4 case, and we didn't do it for that reason. Also, I 
5 should point out that the rebuttal witness that Mr. 
6 Collins mentioned was someone I have never heard of 
7 before. 
8 MR. COLLINS: I could tell you who he is if 
9 I haven't already. Excuse me, Your Honor. I didn't 
10 mean to interrupt. 
11 THE COURT: I'm faced with a rule here of 
12 whether I have -- if there hasn't been an obligation 
13 to disclose, whether I have the right to obligate you 
14 now to disclose. 
15 MR. COLLINS: There have been 
16 interrogatories, Your Honor, asking who your 
17 witnesses are going to be. In fact, I remember an 
18 exchange I had with Mr. Davies a couple of weeks ago 
19 where I asked him who his witnesses were going to be, 
20 give me a list of who you're going to call and then 
21 we'll tell you, and I did that, and I haven't heard. 
22 That may be in the realm of courtesy or truthfulness, 
23 but if I ask him, he's got an obligation to disclose 
24 it. 
25 THE COURT: I'll hear you further, but if 
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1 that's the way that it has been asked, I will require 
2 you to respond. 
3 MR. DAVIES: And let me respond to that as 
4 well, Your Honor. It's my position, and so far it's 
5 worked on all the cases I've handled, that when 
6 someone asked me in interrogatories who my witnesses 
7 are going to be, I typically say — usually that 
8 question comes very early in the case, and I say, I 
9 don't know yet, and we will tell you when the Judge 
10 tells us to tell you. If you ask a scheduling order 
11 in this case, and you get a scheduling order, we'll 
12 comply with the scheduling order, and that's our 
13 response. 
14 It's my view that if someone doesn't like 
15 that response, which is based on an objection, it's 
16 their obligation to go before the Court on a motion 
17 to compel and get a response from us. But if they 
18 let it go, and they take no further action in 
19 response to that objection, then that's it. We get 
20 here at court, and we are not bound by anything 
21 because we objected, and that's what happened here. 
22 We objected. We made no response. The Court did not 
23 set a scheduling order for disclosure of witnesses, 
24 but voluntarily, we've provided information to the 
25 extent that we thought appropriate. Now, with regard 
16 
1 to --
2 THE COURT: Let me tell you what my 
3 attitude is, Mr. Davies. My attitude is that, 
4 voluntarily, your obligations to disclose exceed the 
5 mandated obligations by the Court. 
6 MR. DAVIES: And we indicated in our 
7 disclosure that the following would be our witnesses, 
8 plus any necessary rebuttal witnesses. Let me 
9 address the specific issue here. It's this, if I 
10 tell Mr. Collins exactly who this witness is, and if 
11 I give him further information about that, I think it 
12 will completely eviscerate the effectiveness of the 
13 witness's testimony for a very legitimate reason. 
14 That's why I called it rebuttal, because that 
15 witness's testimony would only be necessary for when 
16 the Plaintiff gets on the stand, when she testifies 
17 and lies. And if she lies, that is a surprise, and I 
18 need to rebut with this witness. If she tells the 
19 truth, I guess that testimony may not be necessary. 
20 MR. COLLINS: Your Honor --
21 MR. DAVIES: As soon as I tell him who this 
22 is and what we have, it changes the testimony. She's 
23 going to change her testimony. I guarantee it. 
24 MR. COLLINS: Your Honor, that's not how 
25 the rule works. In Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of 
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1 Civil Procedure, it provides an ongoing obligation to 
2 parties to provide information responsive to 
3 interrogatories as they learn them. If they didn't 
4 know he was going to use this guy early on, he still 
5 had an obligation. It doesn't work that way under 
6 the rules or under customary appropriate behavior. 
7 THE COURT: Well, let's just assume that 
8 they have. Let's assume the other side of the 
9 equation here for just a minute. Let's assume that a 
10 witness gets on the stand and lies about something, 
11 does the other party have the right to call an 
12 undisclosed witness to rebut the lie? And I would 
13 say the answer to that is probably yes. 
14 MR. COLLINS: And I think so, Your Honor, 
15 and I considered handling it that way, but I decided 
16 to say his name just so we didn't have a problem in 
17 case one of the jurors knew him or in case the Court 
18 didn't agree with me about that. 
19 THE COURT: And so you would agree with the 
20 "yes" on that, wouldn't you? 
21 MR. COLLINS: If somebody is going to say 
22 something that's totally unexpected, this concept of 
23 lying, I don't know how that fits, Your Honor. It 
24 depends on how you characterize that. If they know 
25 essentially what our testimony is going to be in this 
00 
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1 case from taking my client's deposition twice, and I 
2 have a feeling this has to do with certain 
3 activities. 
4 If they think they've got something on her, 
5 they know what she's going to say from the 
6 depositions. We're entitled, as a matter of fair 
7 play, to know what they've got. There's no surprises 
8 on our case. If there was a surprise, if they 
9 thought there was going to be something, something 
10 unexpected, a surprise to them, something radically 
11 different from what discovery had disclosed, that 
12 would be one thing. 
13 THE COURT: I'm not sure if that applies if 
14 it's just a surprise. Let's suppose that in 
15 discovery -- not to use this case. I know nothing 
16 about the discovery, but let's suppose that there's 
17 somebody with a back injury who claims they can't 
18 play tennis or water-ski anymore, and let's suppose 
19 that they get on the stand and they testify that they 
20 can't play tennis and water-ski. 
21 Now, you know in advance that they're going 
22 to testify to that, because they've done it in a 
23 deposition. And so in rebuttal, does the other party 
24 have the opportunity to investigate and find that, 
25 indeed, they both played tennis and water-skied, and 
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1 they have films of it after the injury? Now, do they 
2 have to disclose that? 
3 MR* COLLINS: Sure, they do. 
4 MR. DAVIES: I don't think so. 
5 MR. COLLINS: Judge, if they know it's 
6 coming, and they know the essence of what the 
7 Plaintiffs' testimony is going to be, if there's been 
8 a court order on exhibits or on witnesses that they 
9 reasonably think that they will or may use or if 
10 there's interrogatories asking those same questions, 
11 why should that be any different from any other area 
12 that we deal with? 
13 THE COURT: Because what it does is, the 
14 party knows whether they've water-skied or played 
15 tennis in the hypothetical that I've used, and they 
16 know whether they've been asked if they have after 
17 the injury, and they've testified, I have not, I 
18 cannot, the injury precludes it. Now, what can be 
19 more dramatic than to show testimony that that is a 
20 lie, because the party knew when they said it in the 
21 deposition that it was a lie, and they knew 
22 thereafter that it was a lie when they testified in 
23 trial, and now the other party has the right to show 
24 the witness to be what the witness is. 
25 MR. COLLINS: There's no exception to the 
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rules for drama, Your Honor, should it be dramatic, 
but it doesn't mean that you don't have to disclose 
it if you know it's coming. 
MR. DAVIES: This is an odd discussion. 
Maybe Ms. Roundy will say that she can't remember 
playing tennis more than three or four times, you 
know, and maybe she's trying to play tennis, and 
maybe they're going to have her where she was playing 
tennis, and maybe they're going to try to blow that 
up into a lie. I don't think there's going to be any 
black-and-white stuff here on her saying that she 
absolutely flat can't do something and act like she 
doesn't have a problem, make her look like she 
doesn't have a problem in the world. It could be 
just a question of degree that's going to be made 
into something different. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Davies, do you -- . 
MR. DAVIES: One final thought, Your Honor, 
and that is, I don't know what difference it makes to 
Mr. Collins. what are they going to do with this, 
anyway? 
THE COURT: The only difference — 
MR. COLLINS: I want to see it. 
THE COURT: I don't have any idea what it 
is. I don't have any idea who the witness -- I don't 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAINA ROUNDY 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
TRAVIS STALEY, 
CASE NO. 940906068 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DEFENDANT 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
240 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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WE HOPE WE KNOW WHAT IT TAKES TO CONVINCE A 
"TRY TO FIND THE TRUTH IN THE CASE, AND I HOPE WE'VE 
'.lil'ttli Vi'HI HV TIIK I'PERKN"" ' ' N ur liih APPROPRIATE 
EVIDENCE, SO THAT YOU CAJN .... -"'-. 
I'HT WK IIF.VEF, KNOW, NOk BJIUULJ n£ TRY TO 
!S WHAT YOU ARE THINKING AND WHAT'S IMPORTANT TO 
I ,'irrppOSE THAT YOU COULD FIND FOR THE 
t'LAINTIFF, AND YOU COULD DO THAT IN THIS WAY: YOU 
HIi,n i-MNnTnrcv ALL THE EVIDENCE THAT SHE PERSONALLY 
rRESENTED. 
AND ONLY THE MOST FAVORABLE EVIDENCE THAT 
"
TTT
^ PRESENTED, DISREGARDING THE INCONSISTENT 
EVIDENCE THAT SHE GAVE. AND IGNORE EVERYTHING ELSE, 
,
 T T m T T „ 0 T H E R TESTIMONY AND ALL THE OTHER EVIDENCE 
THAT CAME IN FROM ALL THE OTHER WITNESSES. AND THEN 
YOU COULD FIND TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
BUT THAT'S NOT HOW THIS WORKS. THAT'S 
*
TOT THE W* v TT SHOULD WORK. T r.w THE IMPRES. _ N 
iOM M •'OLLIN- STATEMENTS THAT PERHAPS HE THINKS 
i '.",.' 1AA.M I.N Till',' E 
RESENTED THIS CASE, AND THAT I HAVE BEEN TOO 
T 
GAINST MY CLIENT 'UDGE TOLD YOU THAT THE 
•T 
iFFENDED YOU BEING TOO AGGRESSIVE. 
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HOPE YOU WON'T HOLD THAT AGAINST MY CLIENT. 
I THINK SOMETHING THAT'S BEEN LOST IN THE 
CASE SO FAR IS THE FACT THAT IT IS ABOUT JUSTICE. 
AND JUSTICE, AS YOU APPLY IT IN FINDING THE FACTS ON 
THIS CASE, PERTAINS TO BOTH PLAINTIFF AND THE 
DEFENDANT. SO FAR, YOU'VE HEARD ABOUT ALL IN THIS 
CASE IS ABOUT THE PLAINTIFF, THE ONE PARTY. BUT WE 
HAVE TWO PARTIES IN THIS CASE. THE OTHER PARTY IS 
TRAVIS STALEY. 
AND IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE CLAIMS THAT 
ARE BEING MADE IN THIS CASE AND THE WAY THEY HAVE 
BEEN PURSUED IS NOT FAIR, IS NOT RIGHT. AND IT'S 
NOT REAL. ONE OF THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT YOU 
HEARD, I THINK IT'S NUMBER 11, WAS THAT IF YOU FEEL 
ANY WITNESS HAS TESTIFIED -- WILLFULLY TESTIFIED 
FALSELY TO ANY MATERIAL MATTER, YOU MAY DISREGARD 
THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF THAT WITNESS, EXCEPT AS THAT 
WITNESS MAY HAVE BEEN CORROBORATED BY OTHER CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE. 
THIS CASE HAS TO DO EXACTLY AND PRECISELY 
WITH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF. ALL SHE HAS 
TO PROVE ANY PART OF HER CASE, WHETHER IT'S THE 
LIABILITY OR HOW THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, OR THE FACT 
THAT SHE'S CLAIMING THE INJURIES SHE'S CLAIMING, IS 
ALL BASED COMPLETELY ON HER OWN SAY SO. 
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, THE 
•LAINTIF:- 3 U R D E N F 3 ' E S P E C I A L L Y ON 
N E G L I G E N C E . WANT SUGGEST WE NEED 
MEAN? 
EITHER THINK THAT CLEAR FROM THE EVIDENCE 
"AT W H A T 'I'!.'AVI,'1 Dill WA,1! A P P P 0 P PI A T K , PASEli nil TIIK 
BULK UK THK TESTIMONY AND THE WITNESSES, THEN HE 
TNS . 
:EALLY TEL" THEN THE LAW 
'-" ' 'J A PERSON RESPONST fuK AN 
ACCIDENT PEOPLE COULDN'T REALLY 
TELL WHO WAS AT FAULT. BECAUSE THAT'S THE LAW 
"T'S NOT ALLOWED SO THAT'S JUSTICE. 
SO IT'S OUR POSITION THAT xx-o PRETTY CLEAR 
THAT TRAVIS WAS OKAY. IF Y r\ TT n "K vr i T'T TELL., THEN THEY 
ALSO HAVE FAIL, BECAUSE THAT o uJSTICE. ALL RIGHT 
NOW LET'S' TALK FOR ft MINUTE ABOUT 
PLAINTIFF INJURIES A NE "THI S GOES 
IJ 1 li "L!" H I «i E lii 1 1 ]CrEI !: ! i 
GOES WHAT INJURIES THE PLAINTIFF HAS, 
THIS CASE 
THAT OCCURRED ITSELF OR HER INJURIES OF HER MEDICAL 
I "I ! 1 '« ) ^ i 
A± 
TREATMENT OR WHATEVER, BECAUSE AS I READ FROM THE 
INSTRUCTIONS EARLIER, IF YOU FIND THAT SHE'S 
WILFULLY TESTIFIED FALSELY, 
HER TESTIMONY, AND ALL THE 
WELL, THIS IS 
TO BE PRETTY WELL WHAT SHE1 
YOU CAN THROW OUT ALL OF 
EVIDENCE SHE PROVIDED. 
HARSH, BUT THAT APPEARS 
S DONE HERE. IMAGINE, IF 
YOU WILL, HOW HARD IT IS FOR PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE 
DEFENSE OF A CASE LIKE THIS 
PROVE-- OR WHO HAVE TRY TO 
CLAIMES SUCH AS THOSE MADE 
COME UP WITH INFORMATION. 
, WHO ARE TRYING TO 
DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST 
HERE, HOW HARD IT IS TO 
ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU'RE 
TALKING ABOUT SOMEBODY'S INJURIES. 
NOW, IT WOULD 
FOR US TO JUST SIT BACK AND 
IN AND TELL YOU, "I'M HURT, 
CAN'T PLAY TENNIS, I CAN'T 
BE HE VERY EASY INDEED 
LET THE PLAINTIFF COME 
I HAVE THESE SYMPTOMS, I 
DO THIS, I CAN'T HOLD A 
BABY, I CAN'T DO THAT." AND FOR US TO JUST SIT 
THERE AND SAY, "PLEASE DON' 
HAVE ANYTHING TO SHOW YOU, 
HER. " 
THIS CASE IS 
CREATED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO TRY 
T BELIEVE HER. WE DON'T 
BUT PLEASE DON'T BELIEVE 
A FICTION THAT HAS BEEN 
HER HUSBAND. AND WE 
TO COMBAT THAT. NOW, I 
KNOW THAT CERTAIN JURORS ARE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED OR 
EVEN OFFENDED ABOUT THE IDEA OF SURVEILLANCE BEING 
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1 
2 LAYING TENNIS AND THERE ^ Y . : .- TENNIS THERE'S 
3 ' - : 
4 MOV INC- TARGET THE WHOLE TIME *;». -IN h-.r> 
5 
6 
7 
8 ZAUGHT HER PLAYING TENNIS .DKO :'AP: tfHO 
9 
CAUGHT HER DOIN' . . •-s CHANGES HER STOR i 
"X UAJN III* T 
• K K . .• .; -- • •• • SAME --.. IN OCTOBER? 
"
 v
 vto Kui CHANGED, THAx xx WAS 
SAME OCTOBER, WHEN SHE S S T " " •*• ^A?T'T TTSE MY 
it 
WELT -m.«
 B E E N T!TT7 SAME WAY AIL THE 
WAY THROUGH THIS. I MEAN, ONE TIME IT'S ONE THING 
"ND ANOTHER TIME IT'S SOMETHING ELSE. THERE IS 
ALWAYS
 AJW EXPLANATION FOR EVERYTHING. 
SHE ALSO EXPLAINS E V E R Y TIJ 1N (J A W A !i!
 t I," I i 
^EAVEN HELP US, HOW ARE WE EVER GOING TO 
, ,URK Til All W'Mjy'i I I hi I'll! LI K K N P LI I!.!"'1: ""III"" 
* '':"- P A N ? M m : L O O K S N A T U R A L O N T H E T A P E . 
II 1 III" I! "„ II. "Ill1 III I K 
^.-. - SOMEBODY GET AWAY WITH THAT. IT'S AN 
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ABUSE OF THE SYSTEM. SO THERE IS NO WAY YOU CAN 
BELIEVE HER. HER WHOLE CASE, OR WHAT SHE HAS TO SEE j 
IN HER OWN TESTIMONY. AND YOU CAN'T BELIEVE HER. 
MR. DAVIES: 3 0 MINUTES, MR. DAVIES. 
MR. COLLINS: OKAY. SO IT WILL JUST BE 
ANOTHER MINUTE OR TWO, AND I'LL WRAP THIS UP. 
WHEN YOU ANSWER THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM, 
IT'S CERTAINLY WITHIN YOUR PROVINCE TO ANSWER THE 
WAY YOU NEED TO. BUT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT TRAVIS 
STALEY NOT BEING NEGLIGENT. OR IF YOU DON'T KNOW, 
AND THAT ALSO MEANS HE'S NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE INJURIES THE PLAINTIFF AS CLAIMED. WELL, AT 
THIS POINT IN TIME IT'S PRETTY IMPOSSIBLE TO BELIEVE 
j THAT SHE HAS THIS ARRAY OF INJURIES SHE CLAIMING. 
SO NOTHING THAT TRAVIS STALEY DOES HAS 
CAUSED INJURIES TO HER, BECAUSE SHE DOESN'T HAVE 
THOSE ARRAY OF INJURIES. WAS THIS NEGLIGENCE? 
WELL, SHE MADE THE LEFT HAND TURN IN FRONT OF A 
VEHICLE THAT WAS SO CLOSE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN 
IMMEDIATE HAZARD. SHE WAS NEGLIGENT. 
WHAT ARE THE SPECIAL DAMAGES AND GENERAL 
DAMAGES? I JUST WANT TO COMMENT ON THIS BRIEFLY. 
THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS CASE HAS A BIG SMORGASBORD OF 
CLAIMS, IF YOU WILL. 
THEY ARE TAKING THAT SMORGASBORD AND 
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INSTKIir ,pri<>i 11 I<I _ ( ^ _ 
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, 
you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been 
I niftoboi ilnl by oilier rinlihlr i \ mini IN r 
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INSTRUCTION NO. i f 
If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff was 
also negligent- If the plaintiff was negligence and the plaintiffs negligence was a proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs own injuries, the plaintiffs negligence must be compared to the 
negligence of the defendant. 
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the total negligence 
causing the plaintiffs injuries may still recover compensation; but theamount will be reduced by 
the percentage of the plaintiffs negligence. If the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater 
than the negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiff will recover nothing. 
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